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Life Stance and Religious Identity in an Urbanised World. 
The Meaning of Life as a Modern Predicament 
Rik Pinxten and Lisa Dikomitis 
 
‗A moral culture is one in which decisions take into account considerations of 
good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust. Without the support of such a culture, 
which helps to assess the behaviour of ourselves, other people and institutions, 
enhanced civic participation is inadequate‘ (Lasch-Quinn 2003: 33). 
 
This citation puts great emphasis on sense and meaning of life for good life, both for 
individuals and for societies. The quote comes from a text that, as so many analyses today, 
deplores the decline of life stance and moral-religious rules and values triggering the 
shrinking of civil society. The question we address in the present contribution is: what can be 
understood by the impact of the urban way of living for a growing majority of humanity on 
the meaning of life and on the ways life stances and religions are transferred? More 
poignantly, do the loosening grip and the decrease of control by kin and/or small community 
in the urban context produce freedom, anxiety, creative potential or other reactions in the 
generations who grow up in larger urban areas? It may not be a moral or existential loss, but it 
certainly makes for new formats to deal with the meaning of life (see Geertz 1973). 
The urbanisation of the world seems an irreversible fact (with over 60 per cent of the 
world‘s population already living in urban contexts in 2005, Castells 2002). In that sense, the 
trend is a universal one, going hand in hand with a rapidly deploying globalisation of services, 
communication and trade. At the same time nationalism is far from dying out, and trans-
national relationships and ditto travel and trade are becoming part of the daily life of millions 
of people. The growth of urban contexts and of urban living conditions happens in a 
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globalising world, with a rise in demography and a sharp growth in the battle for natural 
resources (e.g., water, oil, gas, uranium, etc.). In that historical context the new information 
technologies (mobile phone, PC), the communication explosion (the internet and the search 
programs) and tourism and trade are having a gradually deeper impact on lifestyle, on 
knowledge and on the religious and cultural taste and value systems. At the least, that is what 
we all experience in our private life, when looking at the younger generation and comparing 
their use of the media and the IT facilities with that of only two decades ago. The 1990s will 
certainly be remembered as the decade of the breakthrough of the mobile phone and the PC in 
a large segment of the world‘s population. The so-called ‗peace dividend‘ of that time allowed 
for an unforeseen and sudden expansion of this technology. We are now trying to assess the 
impact on the traditional domains of anthropological inquiry: kinship ties, beliefs, values, 
tastes, material products and religion. While the globalisation processes involve a great 
percentage of humanity, and in some cases (like natural resources or the market economy) the 
whole of the world‘s population, it is important to keep in mind that it does not intrinsically 
entail equal opportunities or equal health and wealth for all. We need to reflect on the uneven 
interconnectedness of people as well. As Friedman (1997: 70) puts it: ‗We  are told that the 
world is one place, but for whom, one might ask!‘ Unfortunately globalisation, which by the 
very name for the trend seems to imply the inclusion of everybody, in actual fact produces 
new exclusions and continues some of the old inequalities (see Allen and Hamnett 1995). 
With this contribution we offer at the very least some insights in this research area. We 
are aware that a literature exists in each of the sub-disciplines involved. Although we 
obviously appreciate this work, itwe will hardly be refered to in a systematic wayin a 
systematic way to it. Indeed, we do not want to assess the field nor bring a state of the art 
contribution, but r. Rather, we feel free to develop a rather theoreticalphilosophical angle to 
the whole field and try to come up with sharp and relevant questions where possible where we 
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can. Some aspects of the problematic we sketch were dealt with in some previous work, and 
some in other contemporary research by others  elsewhere (Casor by us (e.g., Castells 2002; 
Pinxten, Verstraete and Longman 2004). 
As anthropologists we all have a sort of idiosyncratic attitude, at least when compared 
to researchers in religious studies, whom we address here as well. That is to say, 
anthropologists tend to be especially knowledgeable in one particular field, and hence to 
sometimes approach questions under an almost casuistic angle. As authors guilty of this vice 
we have come to appreciate the tremendous importance of the deep analysis of a case and will 
not in any way try to deny the strength of fiercely detailed empirical studies. However, we 
also have come to learn that comparison is of the essence if we want to avoid casuistics is to 
be avoided and allow for a scientific model or theory (Geertz 1983). On top of that we 
personally side with the emphasis on the importance of the conscious and scrupulous 
contextualisation of anthropological knowledge (Nader 1993; Pinxten 1997). So, the general 
tendency of this chapter will be one of broad comparative analysis with an acute awareness of 
the contextual constraints of cultural and religious phenomena (including these thoughts 
themselves) in the present world, instead of arguing in minute detail on the basis of available 
ethnographic data. 
 
Making Sense in the City 
 
For the past fifteen years the research group Centre for Intercultural Communication and 
Interaction (CICI) at Ghent University has been exploring a model on identity dynamics. The 
general metaphor we hold when thinking about cultural identities is a visual one: the chiasm -
best known as the butterfly attractor - represents in a graphic way how identities are formed 
and reshaped in a continuous way, showing temporary structure and ongoing shifts and 
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restructurings at the same time (Pinxten et al. 2004). Members of the research group have 
been elaborating aspects of the model in processes of gender identity (Longman 2004), of 
religious identity (Orye 2004), of cultural and intercultural identity (Pinxten and De Munter, 
2010; Dikomitis 2005; van Dienderen 2004). Two times in a row we organised conferences 
on extremist exclusivist identity as is the case with racism (Evens 2002; Pinxten and Preckler 
2006). 
The latter symposium posed the question of new forms of exclusion through racism in 
large cities in the world. That was the first time we explicitly linked our model with the urban 
issue (the symposium took place in 2002). In becoming more acutely conscious of the 
importance of the urban context for humanity now and in the future, we decided to explore the 
link between the urban condition of life and culture more systematically in the following 
years (see Pinxten and De Munter 2010, and the an international symposium Making Sense in 
the City, 2006).  
The basic philosophical question of our focus needs some explanation. When we try to 
combine the knowledge of religious studies with that of anthropology a most intriguing 
problem materialises. In the perspective of our identity dynamics model the learning 
processes in religions can be characterized as identity forming paths, where religion is a 
vehicle for identity construction (see Pinxten and Verstraete 2004). That is to say, either in the 
education of mythological meanings or in ritualistic practices every new generation is 
socialised in a tradition or in an identity group by means of religious markers: one is raised 
from childhood to adulthood in age groups undergoing a series of rituals together, one is 
initiated in the holy lore of the tradition through becoming knowledgeable in the sacred 
stories, and so on. Religious beliefs and/or practices can be analysed as vehicles for identity 
dynamics. This need not imply that they are the only ones, nor that this is their sole use or 
function. It only states that it gives us an insight (which has comparative potential) of how 
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religious traditional practices and/or beliefs work in the socialisation process. Continuing a 
local identity may safely be regarded a role of religion (Pinxten, 2010).  
From that axiom we then move on to the bold generalisation that in the relatively 
recent non-colonial analyses in religious studies it appears that religions do constitute identity 
for a group primarily by using one or two types of basic referents: the small group (village, 
lineage group, clan, age groups and what have you) or the genealogy. 
In several myths of origin (e.g., Long 1964) a genealogy of the people is described: 
this allows for the contemporary clans or for the kinship groups to situate themselves vis-à-vis 
one another within the great stream of the people. In some instances (most notably in the Old 
Testament) it explains for everybody of the present generation how and why they are related 
with each other through belonging to one people. Where the blood tie and the descent from 
the first days till the present time are crucial for the religious identity of Judaism and hence of 
the Jewish people, some other traditions adopt a mixed genealogical model. Navajo Indians of 
the USA, for example, give a primary identifier role to clan membership, but the genealogical 
reasoning is more open than in the tradition where blood ties are dominant and exclusive 
markers: new clans emerge every so often in the history of the people through intercultural 
marriages, expanding the range of the people occasionally (Witherspoon 1977). 
A second referent, which allows possibly for even more variation and fuzzy borders is 
that of the small group. This could either be the household, the family (especially the 
extended family), the neighbourhood or the village. The very model of democracy was 
founded in what today would be regarded as a village context: the ancient Greek ‗polis‘ was 
usually a community of twenty or thirty thousand free citizens. Athens at its highest moment 
of glory counted not more than one hundred thousand citizens (Dutoit 1989). In terms of our 
present day world, these are villages or at best little towns. Sociologically speaking these 
concentrations of people are controllable: in principle, all contacts within such a context can 
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at some point in life or other become face-to-face contacts. Put differently, within the 
constraints of this kind of magnitude (i.e. the village) all people can be known and treated as 
persons one has encountered ‗in the flesh‘ or heard about as neighbours or relatives. In 
technical terms the ‗polis‘ has mainly group characteristics: interactions between people have 
primarily the character of face-to-face contacts (Pinxten and Verstraete, 2004). In 
contemporary cities, and most certainly in the vast and mixed complexes of the multi-million 
metropolitan areas like Mexico City, Tokyo or even Brussels, this character does not obtain. 
They harbour communities where face-to-face contact is a minority phenomenon (happening 
in small groups within the complex), but is unattainable at the level of extension of the city as 
such. One cannot communicate in a direct way with a million people, even not even in a 
lifespan. One can only invest in virtual interactions when one wants to reach the community 
inhabiting a large city: through advertisements, media, papers and books, and the like. 
The general thesis in thinking about sense making in the city (meaning especially the 
contemporary type of large concentrations of people) then becomes: to the extent that 
religions and other types of Weltanschauungen stick to the old referents of descent lineages 
and (small) groups, they cannot offer an adequate answer on the meaning of life at the level of 
the larger cities. Or, alternatively, it is relevant to look into/ at? the ways the modern urban 
context impacts on the communication and interaction formats and even on the themes of 
different traditions of ‗making sense‘, even more so when the urban context is worldwide 
becoming the main and dominant one. 
Our general proposal is to try and ‗unpack‘ what the term ‗making sense‘ or ‗meaning 
of life‘ could mean in a thoroughly and irreversibly urban context. Do the rules of conduct of 
the kinship group hold, or is individualism an inevitable and ‗natural‘ attitude of the city 
dweller? Is networking in the present era and in the urbanised context yielding a world filled 
with individualists, and does that mean egoists? Or will it enhance despair and a steep rise in 
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suicides or low thresholds for euthanasia? On the other hand, the rise of different sorts of 
community identities might be appreciated as a quite different response to the same trends of 
globalisation and individualisation.  
 
Augustine on the Human Predicament 
 
Whatever else, Augustine of Hippo (CEAD 354-430) is, unlike some of the later theologians, 
respected by a wide variety of Christian denominations, both catholic and protestant. His view 
is illustrative of the way Westerners have been dealing with sense making. Admittedly, 
modernity has introduced important shifts in the western outlook, but we claim that some of 
the parameters of the primary attitude have not changed. 
In The City of God Augustine presented a powerful view on the meaning of life, 
according to the Christian heritage. He analyses the downfall of the Roman Empire and points 
to the causes of the decline. The barbarians are not the main protagonists: they only finish a 
process of decay with intrinsic dynamics. According to Augustine, the fact that the Romans 
had it all wrong is the main cause: they worshipped the wrong gods, and lived with the wrong 
moral rules. In Augustine‘s interpretation, they did not follow God‘s will. In a remarkable 
proposal Augustine tries to ‗prove‘ in The City of God why the Romans and the heathens in 
general ran themselves into the ground by disregarding God‘s plan, and how the Christians 
can come to know the latter. Creation, the death and resurrection of Christ and the meaning of 
life for every single Christian are explained in one integral ‗theory‘ about the principles and 
workings of the ‗city of heaven‘. 
Human beings will be saved to the extent that they live as much as possible according 
to these divine principles and workings in their miserable and mortal life on earth. Otherwise, 
their life according to the rules of the common ‗city of earth‘ (i.e., that of the Romans and 
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other heathens) will yield eternal misery, making it all pointless or devoid of meaning. The 
important point is not so much the concrete proposal of what people have to do in order to 
gain eternal bliss, but rather the frame of mind where an integral and integrated sense or 
meaning for life is thought out and expressed. 
Moreover, Augustine presents this frame on the basis of an argumentation that shows 
where and why other proposals (in this case those of the heathens) had to fail and how God‘s 
plan takes care of it all by bestowing a keen and thorough deeper sense on human life. 
Moreover, this major shift in thinking about the meaning of life is versed in a metaphor about 
two cities: the city of evil, despair and futile senseless life in the ‗city of the earth‘ and the 
‗city of heaven‘ as an ideal of rules of conduct and beliefs. 
According to our interpretation, the deep message here is that life and everything 
human beings encounter in their world of experience holds a place in one grand encompassing 
ideology which gives meaning to it all.  
We can point to other Church fathers (Paul, for certain) or theologians as well, but the 
point is made and that should suffice. What we emphasize with this short digression on 
Augustine is that the Christian heritage with its emphasis on meaning and sense making, 
understood as an encompassing or integral (cognitive) interpretation of the lived reality, has 
been so pervasive in the history of the West that it gained the status of reality or obviousness 
in the mind of the lay person and the researcher alike. Moreover, this interpretation has a 
normative aspect as well: it yields certain unmistakable rules of conduct and the attached 
values. In other words, according to this tradition life has to have a meaning and sense making 
is an important activity of humankind. Over the centuries the latter emphasis has become 
deeply engrained in Western culture. We adopt the view that ‗there has to be a sense‘ in it all 
and that human beings are only fully human when the dimension of ‗making sense‘ or 
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‗meaning of life‘ is present in their culture. Maybe it even serves as a normative fundament 
foundation for the culture one belongs to.  
In the very notions of ‗primitive culture‘ versus ‗civilization‘ of the nineteenth century 
and that of ‗development‘ in the later era, this emphasis became crucial: if anything, the 
‗primitive‘ lacks the meaning of life or at the very least holds faulty attitudesviews here, 
pretty much in the way Augustine analysed the ‗mistaken‘ position of Romans and heathens. 
Development, in order to catch on, implies the adoption of the normative program of meaning 
of life. At the same time, and not surprisingly, anthropologists have detailed the lack of this 
dimension in numerous traditions (probably somewhat similar to oral Christianity of the pre-
Reformation era).. For example, when asked about the lack of myths and of meaning in their 
elaborate ritual life the Nepalese Jains told anthropologist Humphreys that they did not care 
about that at all. They even advised her, in case she would be in need of myth or meaning, to 
borrow some from other traditions: the Jains had no need for them (Humphreys 1996). 
Similarly, large development programs of the past decades shipped a normative 
program on sense making along with the material project and the discussion on the failures 
often turned on this issue again. This led some critics of the development attitude very 
recently to break away from the attitude and plead for the right to be different (Verhelst 
2003). 
Augustine used the image of the city in his time. Obviously, that image will be hard to 
compare with contemporary urban realities. As mentioned before, the city in those days 
counted limited numbers of people (thousands, tens of thousand, but never even a million, 
Dutoit 1989). Probably the image of the city had to stand in his mind for that of a certain type 
of order: the wrong order (although not really chaos) of the city of the worldearth versus the 
divine order of the city of God. It is clear from the reading of Augustine‘s book that the author 
imagines to be able to have an overview of the ‗city‘, which in itself guarantees this notion of 
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order. Given the fact that the author spoke and wrote at the time of the downfall of the 
western Roman Empire (i.e., the fifth century CE), the proposal can be appreciated indeed as 
an attempt to plead for a concrete and manageable type of order for a relatively small amount 
of people in a context which can be overseen and managed with the proper means. It is clear 
that in the present era, with over 6 billion people we know of (compared to a few millions 
Augustine was aware of) and the concentration of more than half of them in poorly structured 
and fast growing urban contexts which can not be genuinely managed by any central ruler or 
council most of the time, and with impact on large areas and ultimately on the life conditions 
of the whole of humanity, the projection of an ideal order for the world in the image of a well 
ordered city is unlikely. The very notion of the right meaning of life in Augustine‘s 
understanding of the order emanating from God could be advanced in a context of promise for 
a strong mono-cultural Christian world in the making as pitched against the multitudes of 
semi-orders of the barbarians all around. However, in the present world at the very least eight 
strong religious orders are recognized as competing forces to rule large areas of the world by 
rightist thinkers such as Huntington (1996), whereas less opinionated social scientists would 
rather speak about several thousand cultural traditions, which continuously loan and adopt 
traits and practices between each other in an endless chain of lesser or greater transformations 
(Hannerz 2003). The very idea of the one good and holy format for all is less likely now than 
at the time of Augustine, since our knowledge of the diversity in the world is so much greater. 
In terms of the focus of this essaychapter we question whether, to what extent and in what 
way the universalised urban living conditions of humanity will change the relevance or lack 
of the sense making or meaning producing processes, which were so dominant in the Western 
tradition. Will Westerners dilute or even loose their urgency vis-à-vis the meaning of life 
questions, or will the rest of the world adopt this basically religious emphasis in the course of 
the process of urbanisation?  
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The Old and the New Worlds 
The situation in Europe may be different from that in other parts of the world: in 1800 a rough 
3 per cent of the world population lived in urban contexts, mainly in the so-called ‗old world‘ 
(from the point of view of Europe, that is, definitely not that of China). By 2000 this 
percentage has risen to half the population, and the so-called Third World cities are the fastest 
growing urban complexes. In terms of religious expansion through and in cities, Europe is 
cited in recent studies as the sole region in the world where secularism is holding out (Martin 
2005). Everywhere else in the world, according to Martin, religion is on the way up. So, only 
Europe constitutes a ‗problem‘ from the point of view of churches. We are not convinced that 
this is a ‗problem‘, but will not go into this here. We are not convinced either that the 
concepts used (secularism and religion) apply without misunderstandings or potentially 
dangerous abuses throughout the world. We go a bit into the effects of the urban condition 
hereis question here, because it might be leading us to a crucial question about ‗making sense 
in the urbanised world‘. 
We take as a given that presently three generations are living in a shared context 
around the world. On that basis we can speculate on the different experiences and 
perspectives in each of them on the issue at hand. The learning processes of each of the 
generations have shifted rapidly and possibly irreversibly: the present grandparents were 
raised in religious schooling and followed all the regular procedures in their youth and later 
life (baptism, puberty ritual/holy communion, marriage in a church, etc.), but their children 
who are now parents themselves had to engage in a hectic survival struggle as double wage-
earners. For them, the traditional institutions were gradually less frequented, except for the 
grand occasions (like marriages and funerals, for example). Family ties and traditions became 
less important for this generation, where individualism sets in together with a generalised 
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consumerism. The youth of today breaks away drastically from former patterns: they develop 
their personal network of relationships and peer groups, partly through school and leisure 
circles and increasingly through virtual contacts and networks (Castells 1996; Bateson 2000). 
For the first time, from the 1990s on the world of experience expands tremendously by means 
of the availability of mobile phones and PC for a large segment of the present generation of 
youngsters. Over these three generations, urbanisation has been increasing tremendously all 
over the world, triggering a deep change in experiential opportunities and at the same time 
heightening a contradictory way of living in cities. The opposition in life experiences and 
expectations in rural and in urban areas is rapidly dissolving, since on the one hand the 
physical and the informational boundaries between both are blurring (Smart and Smart 2003), 
and on the other hand the information technologies in the past two decades have made it 
possible for people to share life experiences, regardless of their lack of kinship ties or their 
differences in religious background. Paraphrasing Appadurai (1996) one can say that the 
‗imagination combines with new media technology to allow us to affiliate in ways that bring 
us closer to someone around the globe than to our next-door neighbour.‘ (Smart and Smart 
2003: 267). 
In an attempt to assess what such globalisation processes yield in terms of cultural 
(and religious) shifts Hannerz (2003) offers a very useful model of three scenarios. He 
presents an insight in the three types of ‗theories‘ which are around to explain the impact on 
cultural processes and formats of economic globalisation. One scenario projects that the world 
is ‗Westernizing‘ uniformly (e.g., Wallerstein, Klein and others in Hannerz 2003). A second 
one, which is extremely powerful in the political arena today, professes that a small amount of 
‗civilizations‘ (re)emerges in the present era and is due to yield clashes between them in the 
future (Huntington 1996). Hannerz claims that anthropologists do not find empirical data to 
support either of these scenarios. At the micro-level what appears to be happening looks like 
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continuous streams of small transformations, adaptations and reshufflings of cultural 
structures and processes. Hence, anthropologists doubt that the geopolitical trends which are 
proposed by the ideologists and the colleagues of international politics yield uniform patterns 
of living experiences and sense making processes in the local communities. Rather, what we 
observe at the micro-level are continuous small shifts and changes, often captured by such 
notions as ‗creolisation‘ or ‗glocalisation‘. Hannerz speaks about the ‗transformationalist‘ 
view. A better term is needed than any of these three, but we lack a good candidate so far. The 
important point is that the third view looks at the many ongoing little adaptations, lending and 
importing, exchanging and transforming processes going on all over the world in a myriad of 
ways, and yielding numerous new forms of ‗change-in-continuity‘. There is no general 
‗takeover‘ by one or more cultures.  
Moreover, such processes can be witnessed around the world. That is to say, granting 
that Fordism has reached its limit as an economic system in western or other contexts (with 
increased specialisation of production, Keynesian fiscal policies, union-capitalists treaties for 
the benefit of all, etc.) and globalisation is moving up worldwide (with corporate power, 
delocalisation, and so on), the cultural processes and structures do not simply obey these 
economic trends. Rather, culturally speaking one witnesses most of all two concurrent trends: 
worldwide one sees an increase in complexity of societal and cultural processes and an 
increase in diversity of tastes and patterns. The latter two trends manifest themselves in a 
variety of ways and a plurality of smaller or more encompassing processes, indicated in the 
following paragraphs. 
Through urbanisation one sees at the same time an ‗increased connectivity‘ (Smart and 
Smart 2003) as expressed in the worldwide web and a continuation or even a growth in local 
identity. The latter is visible in ever more festivities, but also vigilance activities in 
neighbourhoods, ‗wars‘ between regions or cities, and the like. Especially cities (smaller ones 
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and of course metropolitan areas) face a sudden and encompassing growth in diversity of 
cultures, languages and religions. One of the features pointed at by researchers in this regard 
is that of trans-nationalism (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). That is to say, more citizens detach 
themselves from the local ties and customs they run into when settling in a city as a foreigner. 
Rather, they obey the local rules and do business with the establishment, but at the same time 
they strengthen the ties with their region or country of origin, for which they now became 
successful migrants. Even small cities illustrate this trend in an incontestable way. For 
example, a city like Ghent (Belgium) with some 300,000 inhabitants is now confronted with 
refugees from over 150 non-European countries, while Brussels or Amsterdam have 
migration groups from next to 300 different countries. 
A slightly different perspective points to the growth of so-called ‗double loyalties‘ in 
migrant leaders and communities: Smith (2004) studied in depth the remarkable engagements 
in political mandates of migrants and former residents from Chicano descent. Typically, 
several of them took up offices in their former country (e.g., Mexico, the Caribbean islands) 
while staying loyal to the USA. Similar developments can be witnessed with North African 
and Turkish migrants in Europe. In both of these phenomena the link between citizenship and 
nationality is cut, and engagements and loyalties can hence be detached from the belonging to 
one nation only. 
Another important line of research is offered by political scientists, social geographers 
and urban sociologists. A leading thinker here is Manuel Castells, who was able to sketch a 
theoretical frame combining the analysis of the impact of information and communication 
technologiesICT, urbanization and worldwide political trends after the Cold War. In his 
magnum opus Castells (1996) presents this frame of reference: the rapid deployment of ICT 
in the world (starting in the 1980s) triggered a new division of wealth: those regions which 
have excellent higher education, a climate of freedom and new high tech facilities take the 
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lead worldwide and yield rapid and distinctive new wealth for the population. Most 
commonly these regions are dense urban areas, since the richer urbanized parts of the world 
prove to fulfil all the conditions of excellent higher education, high degree of creativity and 
room for innovation. With the globalization of the capital markets and of some types of trade 
and industry the power of the nation state is quickly eroded. The combination of all these 
trends have us land presently in a world where traditional labour conditions and the 
concomitant national government power dwindle, insecurity on the labour market rises and 
with these all sorts of identity movement flourish. In the latter category we also find all sorts 
of religious identity movements. When their profile and action procedures fit nicely in the 
urban conditions we predict that their success (temporary or not) will be greater. The 
Evangelical and the Pentacostal churches are the better known examples from recent studies 
on these issues (see Smart and Smart 2003). We claim that not all is understood on these 
matters, but that it is at the very least likely that the generalised urban context for human 
populations seems to ‗select out‘ certain types of religious presences. Taking Castells‘s theory 
as a point of departure for further research promises to be very fruitful to contextualise 
processes and structures of ‗making sense in the city‘ (Castells 2002). Obviously we do not 
make a value choice here, saying that developments such as urbanisation or globalisation are 
good or bad in a moral or a political sense. We cannot possibly make such judgments.  
 
New Themes and Engagements 
 
The impact of a series of parameters, which will need to be analysed and thought through 
more thoroughly to be sure, can be assessed more fruitfully with the younger generation. In a 
rather generalised way the old churches, but also the traditional nonreligious sense making 
organisations (the humanist federations, the Masonic lodges, and so on) are said to be losing 
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appeal for the younger generation (e.g., Verté et al. 2006). On the other hand Buddhism is a 
booming phenomenon in the West and in the East, and a variety of New Age, neo-pagan, 
fundamentalist or exotic sense making groups and activities are offered on an ever more 
varied market: sweat lodges from North American Indian denomination are a success in 
Europe, and Wiccas and Satanists are attractive throughout the West. On the other hand, the 
tremendous rise of television preachers and congregations in the Americas as well the birth of 
city shamanism in very diverse places on the globe are only countered by a spread of 
spirituality in many places and the reappearance of traditional churches (catholic, protestant, 
orthodox) in international politics. Finally, all sorts of eclectic products are offered: catholic 
Buddhists, Anglican Buddhists (Smart 1996), vision seekers inside and outside of established 
churches, peyote cults, Santeria initiates, Capoiera Christian scouts, and so on. 
One way of appreciating this variety of religious and life stance forms is by describing 
and eventually assessing them by means of the standards from our past. That is to say, by 
looking at and thinking about them in the religionistic terms outlined at the start of this 
contribution: do they qualify as ‗meaning of life‘ perspectives such as we came to understand 
these in the religious traditions which were developed in the small communities of the past? 
The answer will undoubtedly be that most often they do not. Indeed, people in the urbanised 
world of today increasingly build their own networks in which a variety of sense making 
perspectives can hold their places within one lifetime. More often than before, people pick 
and choose what they like without bothering about a fixed neighbourhood or a binding 
tradition. The city context offers the opportunities and allows for sufficient anonymity to 
carry this through. Some examples illustrate what we mean by this: the North American 
Indians (i.c., the Navajo)one of us works with were members of a medicine tradition and 
became peyotists in the span of two generations: they picked up the peyote cult during 
weekend trips in the cities of Oklahoma, from where it spread over all Indian reservations in 
Opmerking [w15]: There is no 
relevance in remarking this. Give 
another specification for Indians. 
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half a century. In Europe, so-called perennially catholic countries such as France and Belgium 
(especially Flanders) witness a boom of eastern denominations (Buddhist and other 
traditions). Again, the proliferation happens through urban networks. Further examples can be 
found in abundance in ‗non-western‘ places: the shaman tradition of Central Asia surfaced 
again after seventy years of Soviet domination and persecution, taking the form of city 
shamanism now (Denaeghel 1998); China witnessed a rather sudden growth of the so-called 
Falung Gong sect in the metropolises and reacted with a fierce persecution (the Tien an Min 
tragedy). Examples could be multiplied.  
Research questions which emanate from this synthesis are of the following sort: 
-a- One facpoint we want to stressmake is that it is clear that urbanization is an irreducible 
trend for the world population. This is a completely new human predicament: for the first time 
the (larger) urban context will be the predominant one for a growing majority of the human 
population, and hence for formal and informal education of this and the next generations. In 
order to survive and flourish in this new predicament, human creativity will be an essential 
asset. However, forces of inertia may be presupposed to be at work. We know, as 
anthropologists, that linguistic structures are relatively stubborn and conservative. May we 
presuppose that the same is true of sense giving and making processes and their products? If 
we can speak of tradition in the old sense of the term (the immovable, stable ‗core of a 
culture‘) it might be in these domains of the cultural field. Do the formats of belonging and of 
learning about particular traditions yield forces of inertia, which pull to continuation or 
evenand conservatism? 
-b-How can we begin to unwrap the impact of generalized urbanisation in the particular way it 
is taking place: in an economic globalisation context, with growing availability of the new 
information technologies, and fast development of partially structured metropolises in the 
poorer parts of the world? What processes of learning and adaptation, of individualisation and 
Opmerking [w16]: This is not a 
point to make, but a fact that can be 
stressed. Better: A fact we want to 
stress is… 
Opmerking [w17]: Taking care of 
continuation can be a vital factor in 
survival. Why use terms with such a 
negative bias? 
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of belonging take shape there, and what will be their impact on the structures and contents of 
life stances and religions of the younger generation who is rapidly picking up the 
opportunities offered by context and means and develops individualised networks rather or 
‗shops around for values‘ in a variety of traditions on the market? Does this entail that the 
older and established churches are hence bound to withdraw in a hopelessly conservative or 
even reactionary doctrine and practice, which Taylor (2006) seems to imply when looking at 
the ruling of the new catholic pope? Or, put differently, how can such institutes adapt to this 
new predicament? Not only in terms of doctrine (which may be the easier part), but also in 
terms of interpersonal relationships and learning styles. 
-c- If we thought about meaning producing and transferring traditions such as life stance 
systems or religions in terms of continuity and stability (and dearly fought changes) in the 
past, then by doing so we clearly presupposed that uniformity, training new generations to 
become the same as past generations was the general pattern in the processes of making sense. 
That is to say, a group or community was supposed to transfer a doctrine, a meaning system 
or a way of life in a thoroughly uniform way to newcomers or a new generation. To the extent 
that we stick to this emphasis on uniformity and ‗equalisation‘ of all when speaking about 
processes of making sense we may well be forced to drop the notion of sense making 
altogether. Indeed, with growing globalisation and urbanisation it is not clear at all that 
uniformity in doctrine or in practices will still be found in a generation from now. 
Then what concept should we use, or how can we think the possibly loosely structured 
sources of sense or meaning which people will find, use or constitute in this unforeseen new 
predicament? 
-d- The final and most encompassing question may be the one that smacks of a late battle with 
orientalism and colonialism: was the way we thought of sense making and meaning 
production altogether a ‗Western‘ (maybe a Christian) way of dealing with socialisation or 
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enculturation? And do we have to get rid of this in globo and focus on particularism and 
difference, rather than on uniformity and universality? 
The theoretical work of concept analysis and problem identification has not yet begun, but at 
the least we are looking into the issue in a detailed way now. 
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